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"GET OUT NOW OR RISK BEING
TAKEN OUT BY FORCE":
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE
GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY POWER
FOLLOWING A NATURAL DISASTER
INTRODUCTION
In the early morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina began
its disastrous attack on the Gulf Coast. New Orleans was initially
thought to have narrowly missed a certain disaster,' but a day later the
waters of Lake Pontchartrain broke through their levees and swept
into the City of New Orleans. Approximately eighty percent of the
2city was submerged under water.
The destruction was monumental. Reports circulated about entire
neighborhoods that were reduced to "a community of houseboats"
when viewed from above. 3 "These are the scenes of a dying city," one
article started, "an elderly woman dead in a wheelchair outside the
convention center, a note on her lap bearing her name. A horrified
family telling tales of pirates commandeering rescue boats at gun-
point. Corpses left rotting in broad daylight. Angry crowds chanting
for the television cameras "'We're dying!' or simply 'Help!"A
The public disorder was perhaps the most shocking storyline. One
article described the social dynamic just days after the hurricane:
Many people with property brought out their own shotguns
and sidearms [to protect their property]. Many without [prop-
' Joseph B. Treaster & Kate Zemike, New Orleans Escapes a Direct Hit-One Million
Lose Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al. See also Andrew C. Revkin, With Few Warning
Signs, an Unpredictable Behemoth Grew, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A13 (describing the
strength of Hurricane Katrina and how it formed).
2 Joseph B. Treaster & N. R. Kleinfield, New Orleans Is Inundated as 2 Levees Fail;
Much of Gulf Coast Is Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2005, at Al.
3 Id.
4 James Dao, Joseph B. Treaster & Felicity Barringer, New Orleans Is Awaiting Deliver-
ance, N.Y. TDMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A15.
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erty] brought out shopping carts. The two groups have moved
warily in and out of each other's paths for the last three days,
and the rising danger has kept even some rescue efforts from
proceeding.5
Looting was rampant in the city. Colonel Terry Ebbert, the New Or-
leans's Director of Homeland Security, described the looters as not
just "individuals looting... [but] large groups of armed individuals."6
The situation at evacuation centers bordered on anarchy; soldiers at
the Superdome were "overwhelmed by the enormity of the task of
getting the people on buses" and had trouble "distinguishing [be-
tween] degrees of need.",7
Following the devastation of Katrina, much of the nation's atten-
tion was directed at the response, or lack thereof, from the federal
government.8 The Mayor of New Orleans, C. Ray Nagin, pointed to
Felicity Barringer & Jere Longman, Owners Take Up Arms as Looters Press Their Ad-
vantage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A16.
6 Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 2.
7 Dao, Treaster & Barringer, supra note 4.
8 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House's Response to
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16; Dao, Treaster & Barringer, supra note 4; Todd S.
Purdum, Across U.S., Outrage at Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at Al. The local and
federal governments' roles following a natural disaster are often misunderstood. Many believe
that the federal government steps into the resulting chaos with complete control and authority
over all facets of recovery and restoration of order. See Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional
Stretch, Snap-Back, and Sag: Why Blaisdell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty Than Korematsu,
99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1279, 1283 n.18 (2005) (describing FEMA as a "miniature dictatorship"
when "state government cannot muster a sufficiently broad and coordinated relief effort"). One
misconception following the destruction of Hurricane Katrina was the view that the federal
government was supposed to take control of the looting through military operations. In reality,
however, the state controls whether the federal government ever gets involved in an emergency
response to a natural disaster. Before the federal government may take any action, the state must
first request the federal government's assistance. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (providing
federal relief from insurrections against state governments); 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000) (obtaining
federal relief under major disaster assistance programs); 42 U.S.C. § 5173(b) (2000) (providing
for debris removal by the federal government); see also David G. Tucker & Alfred 0.
Bragg, II, Florida's Law of Storms: Emergency Management, Local Government, and the
Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REv. 837, 862 & n.207 (2001) (discussing the process of
declaring a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act). Once the state requests the federal
government's assistance, the state remains at the forefront in directing, controlling, and
organizing the response, while the federal government lends assistance primarily through
funding and coordinating relief efforts. Further, the President is explicitly prohibited from using
the military to perform civil law enforcement unless the civil disobedience rises to the level of
"insurrection" and a state legislature or governor requests federal assistance. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (prohibiting, generally, the use of military forces on American soil)
with 10 U.S.C. § 331 (allowing the President to use armed forces to suppress an insurrection
against a state government). The prohibition on the use of military personnel, however, does not
apply to the National Guard acting under the command of the state's governor. See John J.
Copelan, Jr. & Steven A. Lamb, Disaster Law and Hurricane Andrew-Government Lawyers
Leading the Way to Recovery, 27 URB. LAW. 29, 38 (1995). As a result, the state governor
controls the military enforcement of civil law following natural disasters. After Hurricane
Katrina, Louisiana requested federal assistance, but Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux
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the federal government's delayed response as the main reason for the
continued chaos. In one interview Mayor Nagin exclaimed: "Don't
tell me 40,000 people are coming here .... They're not here. It's too
doggone late. Now get off your asses and do something, and let's fix
the biggest god-damn crisis in the history of this country. ' 9
Lost in the debate over the delay of the federal government's re-
sponse was the method of the local government's response. On Sep-
tember 7, 2004, Mayor Nagin was quoted stating that the residents of
New Orleans who had remained within the city's boundaries must
"[g]et out now or risk being taken out by force." 0 Mayor Nagin's
September 7 evacuation order came as the water was beginning to
recede. The evacuation was inclusive of the entire city and applied to
citizens that were holding out in neighbourhoods that had not
flooded." Many of the holdouts could not understand the reason for
the mayor's order and refused to leave. They claimed that enforce-
ment of the mayor's order would violate their constitutional rights. 2
In addition, the National Rifle Association (NRA) filed a lawsuit
alleging that Mayor Nagin had violated its members' constitutional
right to keep and bear arms when he ordered police officers to take
firearms away from anyone who remained in the city.' 3 In the same
lawsuit, Plaintiff Buell 0. Teel alleged that, while on Lake Pontchar-
train, Sheriffs officers boarded his boat and took his lawfully pos-
sessed rifles.
14
The scope of governmental emergency power has come into the
limelight in the years following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Scholars
and courts alike have weighed in on whether the policies and proce-
dures adopted by President George W. Bush's administration in the
Blanco retained control of the Louisiana National Guard and rejected a proposal from the
President to engage the military in restoring order. See Michael Luo, The Embattled Leader of a
Storm-Battered State Immersed in Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2005, at A26; Scott Shane & Eric
Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk, but Not Levee Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
9 Susan Saulny, Newcomer Is Struggling To Lead a City in Ruins, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, at
A13.
10 Cain Burdeau, New Orleans Mayor Threatens Forced Evacuations as Flood Waters
Slowly Seep Away, ASSOCIATED PRESS DATASTREAM, Sept. 7, 2005, 08:39:21 EST.
I I See Alex Berenson & Sewell Chan, Forced Evacuation of a Battered New Orleans Be-
gins: Officials Warn of Disease and Fire Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at Al; Alex Ber-
enson, One by One, Reluctant Holdouts Obey Mayor's Order To Leave Their Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A25.
12 See Berenson & Chan, supra note 11; Berenson, supra note 11; Alex Berenson, Hold-
outs on Dry Ground Say, "Why Leave Now?," N.Y. TMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al.
13 Complaint, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Nagin, Civ. No. 05-04234 (E.D. La. Sept. 22,
2005), available at http://www.saf.org/new.orleans.lawsuit/complaint.declaratory.injunctive.
relief.pdf.
14 Id. 19; see also Berenson, supra note 12 ("To reduce the risk of violent confrontation,
the police began confiscating firearms on Thursday, even those legally owned.").
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"war on terror" are constitutional. A discussion of the virtues of alter-
native methods of review, although a monumentally important issue
and task, is beyond the focus of this Note. This Note simply sets out
the method that courts have applied when reviewing challenges to
emergency actions, and determines whether the distinctions between
federal and state government emergency power support either a
stricter or more lenient level of review for state government emer-
gency actions following natural disasters. Perhaps in the future, legal
scholarship will resolve the question of what the proper standard of
review is for emergency actions. The focus of this Note, however, is
an analysis of the realities and intricacies of the standard that courts
currently use to evaluate the use of emergency power, without any
judgment on the propriety of that standard. Ultimately, this Note con-
cludes that the courts apply a deferential two-pronged test, and the
distinctions between federal and state governments do not justify a
different standard of review for state government emergency actions.
In Part I, this Note addresses the standard that courts apply to
emergency actions: what it is, where it came from, and how it has
been applied to both federal and state government actions. Part II
addresses whether the standard is properly applied with equal effect
and force to state action following natural disasters. Finally, in
Part Il, this Note applies the standard to Mayor Nagin's evacuation
and firearms orders. 15 This Note concludes, in Part I, that Mayor
Nagin's orders, with one fact-specific exception, would be sustained
under the standard of review that is currently applied to federal gov-
ernment emergency actions.
I. THE PROCESS-REASONABLENESS TEST
An evaluation of emergency power involves two questions. First,
does the government have the emergency power it seeks to employ?
And, if yes, should the government use its power? 16 In a previous
article, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes de-
scribed the courts' approach to challenges of emergency actions taken
by the President in times of war as "process-based, institutionally-
15 This section draws its information from news reports and is limited by the lack of ac-
cess to the benefits of litigation discovery.
16 Professor Oren Gross divides this question into what he terns the "obvious question"
and the "tragic question." The "obvious question" seeks to determine what will promote the
greatest good, while the "tragic question" considers the moral consequences of the act. Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?,
112 YALE LJ. 1011, 1100 (2003) (citing Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some
Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 1005, 1005 (2000)).
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oriented (as opposed to rights-oriented). 17 The courts, they argued,
"have tied their own role to that of the more political branches; where
both legislature and executive endorse a particular trade-off of liberty
and security, the courts have accepted that judgment."'18
Issacharoff and Pildes' presentation of the process-based approach
simplifies the inquiry. They simply ask whether both of the political
branches authorized the action. Their presentation entirely omits the
question of whether the government should use the power. However,
when courts review emergency measures jointly authorized by the
political branches, they do address, although through a highly defer-
ential lens, the reasonableness of the action. An analysis of the rea-
sonableness of the governmental action is, at the least, in the spirit of
asking whether the government should use the power.
Although the courts have never explicitly stated the standard that
they apply, it is clear from the cases that judicial review of emergency
powers involves a two-pronged test. First, there is a Process Prong in
which the courts look to whether the politically accountable branches
of the government have authorized, consented, ratified, or otherwise
approved the challenged emergency action. Second, there is a Rea-
sonableness Prong in which the courts consider the reasonableness of
the action. The courts' reasonableness analysis does not involve a
means-ends analysis of whether the action was narrowly tailored or
reasonably related to the claimed goal. Instead, the courts' reason-
ableness analysis focuses on the government's motivation and ad-
dresses: 1) whether an emergency actually existed;19 and 2) whether
the action was pretextual, or done in bad faith.2°
The Process Prong, as Issacharoff and Pildes describe it, is the de-
cisive factor in some challenges. When the government's action fails
the Process Prong of the analysis, the Supreme Court does not reach
the Reasonableness Prong.21 Likewise, when there has been bilateral
17 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency
Powers: The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 296, 297 (2004).
IS Id. at 333.
19 See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ("[W]hether there is some factual basis
for the decision that the restrictions ... imposed were necessary to maintain order.") (quoting
Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F. Supp. 193, 200 (D.V.L 1989)); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 628 & nn.2-4 (2005).
20 See Avino, 91 F.3d at 109 ("[Wlhether the [executive's] actions were taken in good
faith") (quoting Moorhead, 727 F. Supp. at 200).
2! See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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endorsement from the political branches, no court has ever found the
endorsed governmental action unreasonable.22
The Reasonableness Prong hinges on the government's motiva-
tion. If an emergency does not exist, or if the government does not
claim the existence of an emergency, then, by definition, the govern-
mental action falls outside the scope of an emergency power and any
action taken under a claimed emergency power is unreasonable.23
Courts give deference to the government's determination that an
emergency exists, but this is ultimately a factual question for the
courts.24 The actual existence of an emergency weighs heavily on a
court's consideration of pretext or bad faith. All of the Supreme
Court's major emergency power cases have occurred during uncon-
tested emergencies.
Emergencies present difficult situations. The courts generally
leave the policy matters to the politically accountable branches and do
not conduct a means-ends analysis. A reality of this approach is that
the politically accountable branches are allowed to make poor
choices. The only issue for the courts is whether those poor choices
had an ulterior motivation that went beyond addressing the emer-
gency. As a result, the Reasonableness Prong takes on a seemingly
perfunctory appearance because, in the face of an actual emergency,
the Court has said that it is not for the Court to make the policy de-
termination of the correct course of action.26
The majority of this section outlines the development of the Proc-
ess-Reasonableness test, and its application in some of the Supreme
Court's more significant cases. Toward the end of this section, this
Note focuses on how the courts apply the Process-Reasonableness test
to state government actions following natural disasters before moving
on to the discussion of the distinctions between federal and state
emergency powers in Part 11.
22 This is largely due to the fact that all of the Court's major emergency power cases oc-
curred during uncontested emergencies. See infra note 25.
23 See MUlligan, 71 U.S. at 140 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 628 & nn.2-4 (2005).
25 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (during the United States' war with Af-
ghanistan); Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (during World War HI); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (during World War I1); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (during
World War I); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (during the reconstruction of
the South); MUlligan, 71 U.S. 2 (pertaining to events that occurred during the Civil War).
26 See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 ("[uIt is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom
of [the political branches'] action or substitute its judgment for theirs."); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934) ("Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a
matter of policy is a question with which we are not concerned."); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 141
(Chase, CJ., concurring) ("It was for Congress to determine the question of expediency."); see
also McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514 ("We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the
legislature.").
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A. Court Review of Federal Emergency Power
1. The Beginning of the Process Prong
Nearly every discussion of emergency powers in the United States
begins with a discussion of Ex parte Milligan2 7 and Ex parte
McCardell.28 These two cases are linked because inasmuch as
Milligan stands for a rights-based approach to judicial evaluation of
emergency power (the civil libertarian position), the ensuing backlash
to the Milligan decision is credited with producing the Court's recan-
tation and adoption of a process-based approach just two years later in
McCardell.
29
In 1862 President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
claiming authority under martial law. 30 Congress, responding to Lin-
coln's actions, retroactively authorized the suspension of the writ, but
regulated the process by which habeas corpus could be denied.3'
During the time that the writ was suspended, Lambdin P. Milligan
was tried before a military commission and sentenced to death.
Milligan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
military commission violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court, despite Congress's retroactive authorization
to suspend the writ, granted Milligan's petition. The Court's decision
was not based on the government's failure to follow the procedure
that Congress set out for the suspension of the writ. Instead, the Court
focused on the constitutionality of the military commission, and held
that "[m]artial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in
the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction" and that
"[martial rule] is ... confined to the locality of actual war. 3 2
The most notable aspect of the Milligan decision is the Court's
broad, rights-based approach to the petition. In the majority's view,
the rights reserved to the people by the Constitution were "irrepeal-
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
29 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 306.
30 See Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1999) ("In
September of 1862, Lincoln proclaimed that any person obstructing military enlistment or
'guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels' would be subject to 'martial
law and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commissions.' Thus, not
only were suspects unable to seek review in civil court through habeas corpus, but they were
subject to trial by military procedure for offenses unknown to the civil law.") (internal citations
omitted) (citing WILLAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CViL LIBERTIES iN
WARTIME 60 (1998)).
31 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 108.
32 Id. at 127.
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able law., 33 Civil libertarians know well Justice Davis's oft-quoted
passage:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more perni-
cious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads di-
rectly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false; for the government, within the Con-
stitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary
to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the
result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.34
But it was the majority's broad holding that led to the public's intense
criticism of the decision35 and spurred future commentators to ob-
serve that "[n]o justice has ever altered his opinion in a case of liberty
against authority because counsel for liberty recited Ex Parte
Milligan."36
Although the judgment in Milligan was unanimous, the opinion of
the concurring justices, authored by Chief Justice Chase, is prototypi-
cal of the Process Prong analysis. In Chief Justice Chase's view, the
issue was not a question of individual constitutional rights, but rather
a question about the relationship between the political branches.37 The
Chief Justice concurred in the result not because of a rights-based
belief that the governmental action was unconstitutional, but because
the authorities failed to follow the procedures outlined by Congress to
make the writ unavailable to Milligan.
President Lincoln himself explicitly acknowledged the need for
joint authorization from the political branches. In a message to Con-
gress explaining the extraordinary measures he had taken, the Presi-
dent stated that his actions were, "whether strictly legal or not ...
ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a
public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily
33 Id. at 120.
34 Id. at 120-21.
35 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 305-06.
36 Id. at 307 (quoting CLINTON RossrrER WITH RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 35 (expanded ed. 1976)).
37 Id. at 303.
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ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the con-
stitutional competency of Congress. 38
The view propounded by the Chief Justice, and apparently ac-
cepted by President Lincoln, came to the forefront just two years after
Milligan in the Court's unanimous decision in McCardell. William
McCardell was a newspaper editor in Vicksburg, Mississippi during
the post-Civil War Reconstruction of the South.39 McCardell was
arrested by military authorities and held for trial before a military
commission for publishing pro-Confederate articles.4° McCardell
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under an act passed on February
5, 1867, conferring appellate review of habeas corpus petitions on the
United States Supreme Court.n1 On March 27, 1868, however, prior to
the Court's decision, Congress passed an act repealing the Court's
appellate review of habeas corpus petitions filed under the February 5
42act. The Court held that Congress, through the act of March 27, ex-
pressly repealed the Court's jurisdiction to hear McCardell's case and
dismissed it. "Thus, the lesson of [the Milligan Court's] attempt at an
aggressive, rights-based set of constraints on Congress during war-
time and its aftermath was that exigent circumstances were ultimately
going to be controlled by Congress, not the Court.' 43
As much as Milligan is the bulwark of a rights-based approach,
McCardell represents the renouncement of that approach and the in-
ception of the Process Prong. The McCardell Court deferred to Con-
gress's determination of the policy issues and stated that it was "not at
liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.""n Subsequently,
however, the Court would add the Reasonableness Prong and inquire
into the government's motives.
2. The Reasonableness Prong
During the turmoil of World War II, the Court decided three of the
most controversial decisions in its history-Hirabayashi v. United
States,45 Korematsu v. United States,4 and Ex parte Endo.47 Few de-
38 Gross, supra note 16, at 1110 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Message
to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 421,429 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)).
39 Tor Ekeland, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1475, 1497 (2005).
40 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 306.
41 Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 507 (1868).
42 1d. at 508.
43 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 307.
44 McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
- 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
- 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
- 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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cisions have been subject to more criticism and disgust than the
Court's decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. As discussed in
detail below, the Reasonableness Prong of the Court's analysis was
infamously displayed in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. However, as
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes note, "[tihat conventional account
ignores the companion case to Korematsu, Ex parte Endo, decided the
same day as Korematsu .... For while Korematsu upheld as constitu-
tional the initial evacuation order requiring the Japanese to leave the
West Coast, Endo unanimously held, at the very same time, that the
detention of the Japanese was illegal. ' 8 While Hirabayashi and Ko-
rematsu demonstrated the extreme deference of the Process-
Reasonableness test, Endo symbolizes the limitations it imposes on
the government.
Due to fears of sabotage and espionage following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 9066 authorizing military control of "the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave" the Western Defense Command.4 9
Congress, on March 21, 1942, endorsed Executive Order 9066 by
passing a law making it a crime to violate a regulation promulgated
under the authority of the order.50 On March 24, 1942, General John
DeWitt, the commanding officer of the Western Defense Command,
established a curfew for persons of Japanese ancestry, 51 and started
issuing Civilian Exclusion Orders setting the dates and times for all
persons of Japanese descent to be excluded from their specified
52military areas.
Hirabayashi addressed the constitutionality of the curfew order.
The Court framed the issue as "whether, acting in cooperation, Con-
gress and the Executive have constitutional authority to impose the
curfew restriction. 53 The very framing of the issue was a pro-
nouncement of the Process Prong. To that end, the Process Prong was
satisfied when the Court held that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable
that Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, ratified and confirmed
Executive Order No. 9066."54
4 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 311. But see Professor Ackerman's more collo-
quial evaluation of the Korematsu decision as "bad law, very bad law, very, very bad law."
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1043 (2004).
49 Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942). The Western Defense Command included
the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. See Muller, supra note 30, at 1403 &
n.19.
50 Act of Mar. 21, 1943, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
51 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (citing 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24,
1942)).
52 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88.
53 Id. at 91-92.
5 Id. at 91.
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The Court, after determining that the politically accountable
branches had jointly authorized the curfew, turned its attention to the
reasonableness of the curfew at the time it was made.55 The fact that
the United States was at war was not in question,56 and it was largely
a foregone conclusion that the curfew was a reasonable use of the war
power. The Court deferred to the judgments of the political branches
and held:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of
judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has
placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any
court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or sub-
stitute its judgment for theirs.57
The Court cited several reasons that, in its view, supported the rea-
sonableness of the government's actions and weighed against the
presence of pretext. 58 The Court cited the census-like statistic that a
large percentage of Japanese citizens in the United States were lo-
cated in the Western Defense Command.59 The Court also thought it
relevant that "social, economic and political conditions ... intensified
[the] solidarity [of the Japanese citizens]."6° Next, the Court cited the
fact that "approximately 10,000 ... American-born children of Japa-
nese parentage [were] sent to Japan for all or a part of their educa-
tion.,,6 1 Finally, the Court gave weight to "the maintenance by Japan
of its system of dual citizenship." The Court concluded that all of the
above factors gave Congress and the Executive reason to believe that
55 In response to Hirabayashi's argument that the curfew should have been applied to all
citizens or none, the Court stated that "[w]e think that constitutional government, in a time of
war, is not so powerless and does not compel so hard a choice if those charged with the respon-
sibility of our national defense have reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real."
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
56 After setting out the procedural history of the case, the Court started its factual state-
ment by noting that, "[o]n December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by a
Japanese air force, Congress declared war against Japan." Id. at 85.
17 Id. at 93.
58 Justice Murphy's concurrence in Hirabayashi came close to finding the curfew unrea-
sonable. Ultimately, however, Justice Murphy's concurrence serves as the best example of the
judiciary's unwillingness to challenge the political branches in times of emergency. See Gross,
supra note 16, at 1034 & n.96. Justice Murphy's concurrence stated that, "[t]oday is the first
time, so far as I am aware, that we have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty
of citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry." Hirabayashi,
320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring). In the end, Justice Murphy concluded that the curfew
order limited to people of Japanese ancestry only reached "the very brink of constitutional
power" and the necessity of the times justified the use of the power. kl. at 111-12.
59 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96 (majority opinion).
6 Id.
61 Id. at 97.
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people of Japanese ancestry subjected the area to risk of sabotage and
espionage.62 By considering these facts relevant to its analysis, the
Court rejected, although not explicitly, the proposition that the gov-
ernment had a pretextual motive.
63
The decision in Korematsu addressed General DeWitt's relocation
orders. The Korematsu Court relied heavily on the conclusions and
justifications set forth in Hirabayashi, and held that the relocation
orders were constitutional.64 The Court acknowledged that "exclusion
from the area in which one's home is located is a far greater depriva-
tion than constant confinement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.,,
65
But the Court held that it was "unable to conclude that it was beyond
the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast." 66 As mentioned above, the
practical effect of Korematsu was little more than symbolic67 in light
of the decision of Endo on the same day.68
Endo addressed the continued detention following the relocation
and was undoubtedly an application of the Process-Reasonableness
62 Id.
63 The pretext to evacuate the Japanese is detailed in Muller, supra note 30, at 1403 n.18,
1411. Professor Muller details the underlying economic and racist motivations associated with
the evacuations.
64 It is noteworthy to mention that the Court found a new reason to support the reason-
ableness analysis, namely that "[a]pproximately five thousand American citizens of Japanese
ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to renounce allegiance
to the Japanese Emperor." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). The Court
was referring to responses to a four-page questionnaire distributed to all Japanese evacuees. The
question at issue read:
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully
defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and
foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other
foreign government, power or organization?
Muller, supra note 30, at 1426 (citing EDWARD H. SPICER Er AL., IMPOUNDED PEOPLE 143
(1969)). In relying on this fact as support for the reasonableness of the action, the Court failed to
recognize the dilemma faced by both American-born Japanese and Japanese immigrants. The
American-born Japanese were "incensed that they were being asked ... to 'forswear' an alle-
giance to the Japanese Emperor when they had never sworn such allegiance [to the Japanese] in
the first place," and the Japanese immigrants "were understandably reluctant to... renounce the
only citizenship they had.., thereby rendering themselves stateless." Id.
65 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
66 Id. at 217-18.
67 Hopefully the decision symbolizes when the judiciary should increase its scrutiny of the
reasonableness of governmental action beyond a tacit acceptance of necessity due to an existing
emergency. Otherwise, as Justice Jackson warned, "[t]he principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need." Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The Court's failure, and chief concern expressed by
Justice Jackson, in Korematsu is the acceptance of any justification or "plausible claim" for the
reasonableness of the action. Id.
68 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 312 (explaining that "the president, perhaps hav-
ing been notified that the Court was going to hold the detentions illegal, had already ordered the
relocation camps closed the day before Endo was decided.").
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test. The Court began its analysis by stating that the Constitution
delegated the war power to the Executive and Congress, and "neces-
sarily gave them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discre-
tion so that war might be waged effectively and successfully. '69 The
Court observed that Executive Order 9066 must be considered in con-
junction with the congressional act that ratified it.70 The Court then
concluded that the continued detention of people of Japanese ancestry
failed the Process Prong because neither Executive Order 9066 nor
Congress' ratification authorized the continued detention of loyal
citizens.7'
The government failed the Process Prong because it conceded that
Endo was a "loyal and law-abiding citizen. 72 The government argued
that the continued detention was a necessary implication of the
continued community hostility toward people of Japanese ancestry.73
Continued community hostility, however, was neither an explicit nor
implicit motivation for the evacuation order. The Court concluded
that the government's concession that Endo was a loyal citizen was
determinative74 because the original motivation for the emergency
action was the prevention of sabotage and espionage.75 The Court
held that the politically accountable branches had not jointly
authorized the continued detention of people of Japanese ancestry for
reasons other than preventing sabotage or espionage.76 Thus, the
government's concession of Endo's loyalty undermined her continued
detention because it eliminated any concern for sabotage and
espionage.
The Court applied the Process-Reasonableness test in each of the
Japanese internment cases. The Japanese internment decisions
demonstrate the deference accorded the government in the
Reasonableness Prong analysis, but they also highlight the Process-
Reasonableness test's limitation on governmental actions. While
Hirabayashi and Korematsu more than aptly demonstrate the extreme
of the Court's deference under the Reasonableness Prong,77 Endo
69 Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-99 (1944).
70 Id. at 298.
"' Id. at 300-01.
72 Id. at 294.
73 Id. at 296-97.
74 Id. at 302 ("The authority to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release as pro-
tection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty is conceded.").
75 Id. ("If we assume (as we do) that the original evacuation was justified, its lawful char-
acter was derived from the fact that it was an espionage and sabotage measure, not that there
was community hostility to this group of American citizens.").
76 Id. at 302.
77 Professor Gross, in his comprehensive article addressing how the use of emergency
powers are and should be evaluated, cited extensive support for his statement that "national
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shows that the government's emergency measures are constrained by
the motivations of the politically accountable branches. Further, Endo
demonstrates that the government cannot subsequently extend
emergency measures based on ulterior justifications, unless the new
justifications are not pretextual and both branches assent.
3. A Modern Application
The decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld is useful to the discussion here
because it shows that the Court continues to implement the Process-
Reasonableness test.
Following the attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the President to
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks ... or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 78
Yaser Esam Hamdi was born an American citizen, but by 2001 he
resided in Afghanistan.79 Hamdi was originally detained in Afghani-
stan by the Northern Alliance, who subsequently turned him over to
the United States military. After the government learned that Hamdi
was a U.S. citizen, they transferred him to Charleston, South Caro-
lina.80 The government designated Hamdi an "enemy combatant
' 8t
and maintained that it could detain him indefinitely "without formal
charges or proceedings.., unless and until it makes the determination
that access to counsel or further process is warranted., 82 Hamdi peti-
courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review governmental actions
and decisions." Gross, supra note 16, at 1034 & n.96. Of particular note is Judge Learned
Hand's criticism that "[the Supreme Court has] not shown themselves wholly immune from the
'herd instinct."' Id. at 1035 n.96 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
(Jan. 2, 1921)). Professor Ackerman, however, takes a more cynical view, arguing that "when a
real crisis arises, judges can display remarkable flexibility for the interim, while covering their
tracks with confusing dicta and occasional restrictive holdings." Ackerman, supra note 48, at
1042.
78 Id. at 510 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001)).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 The Court, for the purposes of this case, accepted the government's definition of an
"enemy combatant" as "an individual who, [the Government] alleges, was 'part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States' there." Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for the Respondents
at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).
8 Id. at 510-11.
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tioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia for a writ of habeas corpus.
8 3
In the district court, the government submitted an affidavit, known
as the Mobbs Declaration, to support its determination that Hamdi
was in fact an "enemy combatant. '84 The district court criticized the
Mobbs Declaration as "little more than the government's 'say-so,'
' 85
and ordered an in camera review of the documents that the govern-
ment relied upon in making its determination. The government op-
posed the order, and the district court certified the question of
"whether the Mobbs Declaration, 'standing alone, is sufficient as a
matter of law to allow meaningful judicial review of Hamdi's classi-
fication as an enemy combatant.''
86
The Supreme Court, keeping with its precedent, implemented the
Process-Reasonableness test. First, the Court concluded that
Congress, through the AUMF, authorized the detention of "enemy
combatants. 87 Second, the Court found that a war did exist, was
ongoing,88 and the government's detention of "enemy combatants"
was an action pursuant to the war power. And finally, the Court found
that the act of detaining unlawful combatants during wartime was "by
'universal agreement and practice' [an] 'important incident[] of
war,' and therefore met the reasonableness requirement for an
emergency measure.89 Thus, the Court determined, by way of the
Process-Reasonableness test, that Congress had authorized the
detention, and, in light of the war in Afghanistan, the detention was
reasonable.
The Court's analysis in Hamdi proves that it continues to apply the
same Process-Reasonableness test developed during World War II.
B. Court Review of State Emergency Power
1. The Use of the Police Power at the State Level
The Supreme Court's most famous case involving a state level re-
sponse to an emergency is Home Building & Loan Association v.
83 Id. at 511.
84 Id. at 512. The Mobbs Declaration stated that interrogation of Hamdi revealed that he
was "affiliated with a Taliban military unit" that had surrendered to the Northern Alliance. Id. at
512-13.
85 kd at 513 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va. 2002)).
86 Id. at 514 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumnsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,462 (4th Cir. 2003)).
87 Id. at 517 ("[W]e conclude that the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for
the detention of individuals in the narrow category we describe...").
88 The Court rejected the argument that the "war on terror" was the conflict at issue and
instead relied on the "[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently... ongoing
in Afghanistan." Id. at 521.
89 Id. at 518 (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942)).
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Blaisdell.90 The Blaisdell decision is the best example of the Court's
use of the Process-Reasonableness test to evaluate a state's use of its
police power in response to an emergency.
In the midst of the Great Depression, the Minnesota State Legisla-
ture enacted the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law. 91 The statute
provided temporary relief through court ordered extensions of sales
and periods of redemption for mortgagors who were unable to make
payments due to the Depression.92 Through the statute, the legislature
declared the Depression an emergency 93 and limited the law's dura-
tion to the "continuance of the emergency."
94
John H. Blaisdell and his wife mortgaged property to the Home
Building & Loan Association. Due to the Depression, however, they
defaulted on their mortgage and the Home Building & Loan Associa-
tion subsequently foreclosed on the mortgage. 95 The Home Building
& Loan Association purchased the property at a sheriffs sale and the
Blaisdell's period of redemption was due to expire on May 2, 1933.96
The Blaisdells petitioned a county district court for an extension of
the period of redemption pursuant to the statute.97 The district court
granted their petition and extended the period of redemption to
May 1, 1935 .98 The Association, however, challenged the postpone-
ment's constitutionality under the Contract Clause. 99 The Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected the Association's challenge and held that the
statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power.1l°
- 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
91 Id. at 415-16 (discussing Act of Apr. 18, 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws 514, pt. 2, § 8,
ch. 339).
92 Id. at 416 (summarizing Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339).
93 Id. at 421-24 n. 3 (quoting Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339).
94 Id. at 416 (quoting Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 339).
95 Id. at419.
% Id.
97 Id. at 418.
98 Id. at 420.
99 U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts...").
i0Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 420. Interestingly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Olsen of the
Minnesota Supreme Court compared the state of emergency caused by the Depression to a
natural disaster:
The present nation wide and world wide business and financial crisis has the same
results as if it were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature. It has de-
prived millions of persons in this nation of their employment and means of earning a
living for themselves and their families; it has destroyed the value of the income
from all property on which thousands of people depended for a living; it actually has
resulted in the loss of their homes by a number of our people, and threatens to result
in the loss of their homes by many other people in this state; it has resulted in such
widespread want and suffering among our people that private, state, and municipal
agencies are unable to adequately relieve the want and suffering, and Congress has
found it necessary to step in and attempt to remedy the situation by federal aid.
Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 340 (Minn.) (1933) (Olsen, J., concur-
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in beginning its analysis, observed that
"[e]mergency does not create power," and further, that the Constitu-
tion's limitations on state power "were determined in the light of
emergency and they are not altered by emergency."' '° The Court, in
essence, was restricting the state's police power to the same restraints
as the federal government's war power by reaffirming the idea that an
emergency is merely a justification for the use of an already existing
power, and not the impetus for the creation of a new power.' °2 So, the
question for the Court was whether the statute was an action within
the legislature's existing police power.
The Court proceeded through a historical review of the Contract
Clause's jurisprudence and concluded that the Contract Clause did not
negate a state's police power to control the enforcement of contracts;
accordingly, the state retains the power to alter an available remedy
so long as the rights secured by the contract are not altered.0 3 Thus,
the Court concluded that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's
police power because it altered the remedy for the breach of the con-
tract, but not the obligation of the contract.
The Court did not need to address the Process Prong because the
politically accountable actor was the legislature, and the plain fact
that the statute existed resolved any process analysis. The Court
framed the remaining issue before it as a challenge to the statute's
reasonableness. 104 The Court was careful to note that it does not con-
sider "[w]hether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of pol-
icy" when reviewing a challenge to the reasonableness of a statute. 0 5
But the Court did consider the legislature's motivation by looking to
the existence of an emergency and who stood to benefit under the
statute to determine whether it satisfied the Reasonableness Prong.
The Court held that the Depression created a state of emergency
that motivated the legislature to enact the statute. 1°6 In reaching the
factual determination that an emergency did exist, the Court paid
deference to the legislature and its express declaration that the
Depression created an emergency. 1°7 Continuing its reasonableness
ring), aff'd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
101 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425.
1 Id. at 426 ("[T]he war power of the federal government is not created by the emergency
of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency.").
103 Id. at 434-35.
101Id. at 438 ("The question is ... whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.").
10 Id. at 447-48.
101Id. at 444.
107id.
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analysis, the Court held that the statute "was not for the mere
advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic
interest of society," and was thus not a pretext."°8 The Court then
looked to the statute's temporary nature. The statute expired when the
legislature determined that the economic depression no longer
existed, which further supported the conclusion that the statue was a
reasonable exercise of an emergency power constrained by time and
limited to addressing the existing emergency.'°9
The Blaisdell decision illustrates the premise that the Court will
apply the Process-Reasonableness test to state emergency actions
with the same effect and force as it does to federal emergency actions.
The Court first established that the police power was the source of
authority that the legislature used when enacting the statute, just as
the Court identified the federal government's war power as the source
of authority for the military commissions in Milligan or the Japanese
internment in Korematsu. The Court then employed the same deferen-
tial reasonableness analysis that it employed in the Japanese intern-
ment cases discussed above.
The remainder of this section focuses on judicial review of state
emergency actions following natural disasters, and how the courts
have applied the Process-Reasonableness test under those
circumstances.
2. State and Local Use of the Police Power Following
Natural Disasters
The number of cases involving challenges to the use of emergency
power following a natural disaster can be described as sparse at best.
The challenges at issue in the cases described below involve an al-
leged restriction of freedom of speech pursuant to curfew orders.
i. Hurricane Hugo and the Virgin Islands Curfew
On September 17-18, 1989, Hurricane Hugo struck the Virgin Is-
lands."0 Hugo caused a significant amount of damage to the infra-
structure of the island of St. Croix and enabled a large portion of the
island's prison population to escape."1 Similar to New Orleans fol-
lowing Katrina, "reports of widespread looting and violence were
prevalent."1 2 The Governor of the Virgin Islands, Alexander Farrelly,
10AId. at 445.
l09Id. at 447.
10 Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (D.V.L 1989).
Il d.
112Id.
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declared a state of emergency on September 21, 1989, and instituted a
"nocturnal curfew between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m."' 13 The
plaintiff, Jeffrey Moorhead, an attorney, was stopped for violating the
curfew. Mr. Moorhead challenged the curfew order and alleged that it
violated his individual constitutional rights and was unconstitutionally
vague. 1 14
Since the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, the court con-
ducted a review of the probability that he would succeed on the merits
of his claim. Proceeding to the Process Prong of the Process-
Reasonableness test, the court's first step was to establish that "[t]he
Governor of the Virgin Islands has statutory authority to impose a
curfew in an emergency."'1 5 Specifically, the governor, under the
Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Act,' 16 has the
authority to "'[c]ontrol ingress and egress to and from an affected
area [and] the movement of persons within the area' and may '[t]ake
any other action [he or she] deems necessary.""' 7 Thus, under the
court's process analysis, the legislature and governor jointly author-
ized the curfew.
The court then considered whether the curfew was "reasonably
necessary for the preservation of order."" 8 The court observed that
"[t]he Governor issued the executive order at a time of grave
emergency; the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo,""19 and the continued
devastation "still justif[ied] the nocturnal curfew.' 120 Thus, the curfew
order was and continued to be reasonable because there was an actual
existing emergency.
The court then addressed "whether the executive's actions were
taken in good faith and whether there is some factual basis for the
decision that the restrictions imposed were necessary to maintain
order."' 12' The court declined to "define precisely what specific
conditions justify continued imposition of the curfew" in order to
refrain from infringing on the "broad discretion necessary for the
executive to deal with an emergency situation.' 2 It did, however,
113id. at 1111.
14 Mr. Moorhead alleged violations of "his right of freedom of association, freedom of re-
ligion under the first and fourteenth amendments, freedom of speech, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, [and] his right to interstate travel as guaranteed by the commerce
clause." Id. at 1111.
115 Id.
16 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1121-1135 (Supp. 1988).
17 Moorhead, 723 F. Supp. at 1112 (quoting V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1125(f)(7), (10)).
I iId. at 1113 (citing United States v. Chalk, 441 F. 2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971)).
1191d.
120Id. at 1110-14.
12 11d. at 11 13-14.
12Id. at 1114 (citing Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1280).
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find that the majority of the property damage was taking place at
night, and without the aid of electricity or telephones, police response
was drastically hindered. 123 Further, the plaintiff did not "conten[d]
that the Governor acted in less than good faith in imposing the
curfew."' 24 With the concession that there was no pretextual motive
and there were existing conditions justifying the curfew, the court
concluded that the curfew order was reasonable and granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the case.
ii. Hurricane Andrew and the Dade County Curfew
Hurricane Andrew is recognized as one of the most devastating
natural disasters in the history of the United States. 25 Prior to An-
drew's arrival, the Governor of Florida declared a state of emergency
in south and central Florida, and authorized city and county officials
to impose curfews. 26 Joaquin Avino, the Dade County Manager, sub-
sequently issued a proclamation establishing a countywide curfew.
Residents of Dade County challenged Avino's curfew order and
claimed that the curfew violated their federal constitutional rights.
Avino's first defense on summary judgment was that he was acting
as an agent of the governor rather than as a policymaker for the
county, and was therefore the incorrect party for plaintiffs suit.
27
The district court disagreed, holding that Avino had final decision-
making authority to issue the curfew and was not acting at the gover-
nor's behest.128 The district court, in deciding that Avino acted with
final decision-making authority, noted that Avino did not have to rely
on the authority conferred by the governor's order. 129 Florida law
authorized local officials to declare a state of emergency and to im-
pose a curfew.13
0
The court's decision that Avino had the authority to issue the cur-
few resolved the Process Prong. The Florida Legislature specifically
123 Id. at 1113.
124 Id. at 1114.
125 Hurricane Andrew caused approximately twenty-one billion dollars in insured losses.
See Treaster & Kieinfield, supra note 2; TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER, NATIONAL WEATHER
SERvIcE, COsTLIEsT U.S. HURRICANES 1900-2004 (ADiUSTED), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/past
cost2.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (damage costs adjusted for inflation).126Smith v. Avino, 866 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
1271d. at 1402.
'28ld. at 1403. The court of appeals passed on ruling on the district court's decision that
Avino had final decision-making authority, stating "[w]e assume, without deciding, that plain-
tiffs here are entitled to a decision addressing their concerns about the constitutionality of the
curfew." Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 107 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
129Avino, 866 F. Supp. at 1403.
130 Id.
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authorized a county manager to declare a state of emergency and en-
act a curfew under the state's police power, and so, with the legisla-
ture and executive in agreement, the court only had to decide whether
the curfew was reasonable. Both the district court and the circuit court
applied the following standard:
[W]hen a curfew is imposed as an emergency measure in re-
sponse to a natural disaster, the scope of review in cases chal-
lenging its constitutionality "is limited to a determination
whether the executive's actions were taken in good faith and
whether there is some factual basis for the decision that the
restrictions ... imposed were necessary to maintain order."'
131
The plaintiffs did not challenge the existence of an emergency cre-
ated by Hurricane Andrew and conceded that the curfew was neces-
sary when it was imposed. 132 Further, they could not produce any
evidence that Avino acted in bad faith when implementing the cur-
few. 133 The circuit court concluded that the plaintiffs' only argument
was that the curfew was unreasonable because it should have included
an exception for citizens to conduct "necessary activity."'134 Relying
on Korematsu, the circuit court held that "[i]n an emergency situation,
fundamental rights such as the right of travel and free speech may be
temporarily limited or suspended"; thus, the plaintiffs' challenge to
the reasonableness of the curfew failed.
135
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE USE OF
EMERGENCY POWER
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to introduce the
Process-Reasonableness test. The following section considers three
fundamental distinctions between the federal government's and the
state government's emergency actions following natural disasters.
The focus of this section is on comparing the circumstances of federal
13t Avino, 91 F.3d at 109 (quoting Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1113-14
(D.V.I. 1989)).
13 2 Id.; Avino, 866 F. Supp. at 1405.
133Avino, 91 F.3d at 109; Avino, 866 F. Supp. at 1405.
134Avino, 91 F.3d at 109.
135 Id. (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). The "necessary activity"
argument is distinguishable from the petitioner's argument in Endo. The federal government's
justification for the Japanese Interment was its fear of sabotage and espionage. The Court
granted Endo's petition because the government's concession that the she was loyal directly
undercut its justification. Here, Avino's justification was the need to restore order, and "neces-
sary activity" does not negate or undercut the restoration of order. In other words, order will not
be restored by the petitioner's "necessary activity," but in Endo the petitioner's commission of
sabotage and espionage was prevented by the petitioner's loyalty.
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and state emergency power actions. Again, the following discussion
does not address what the best standard is for the Court to apply to
emergency powers. The question is whether what is good for the
goose is good for the gander. This section concludes that the distinc-
tions between federal and state are not a justifiable basis for either a
stricter or more lenient standard of review.
A. Police Power v. War Power
The Supreme Court defined the federal government's war power
as "the power to wage war successfully," and added that "[i]t
embraces every phase of the national defense."' 136 There are no precise
limits and rules for the implementation and use of war powers. 137 The
vagueness of the Court's definition is part of the Process-
Reasonableness test's deference to the politically accountable
branches' policy decisions. 138 As demonstrated in the cases above, the
courts consistently state that they will not inquire into the wisdom of
the action nor supersede the judgment of the political branches with
that of the judiciary. 139 A more precise definition of the government's
power would complicate, if not entirely undercut, the courts'
deference.
Similarly, the courts have avoided a precise definition of the state
police power. The police power is defined as "an exercise of the sov-
ereign right of the government to protect the lives, health, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the people."'14 The Supreme Court
has observed that a state's police power "is a vague one which 'em-
braces an almost infinite variety of subjects."",14' Considering the vast
136 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
137 See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-99 (1944) ("And the Constitution when it com-
mitted to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power necessarily gave them
wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion so that war might be waged effectively
and successfully.").
138 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of
Emergency Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 210, 229 (2004) ("The nature of modem emergencies
may make a more flexible model attractive, one in which the appropriate legal instruments can
be tailored to the actual circumstances. This may be a reason for the more extensive use of the
legislative model.").
139EEndo, 323 U.S. at 298-99; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868);
Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.V.L 1989); see also David Dyzenhaus,
Intimations of Legality Amid the Clash of Arms, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L 244, 247 (2004) (arguing
that under the English common law system, the parliament is sovereign and its use of emer-
gency powers is "subject to the normal parliamentary safeguards of question and debate," thus
any judicial inquiry "is, of course, very close to a doctrine of 'political questions' that are, by
their nature, beyond the scope of judicial review.").
140Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437.
141 Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S.
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array of topics addressed by a state's police power, its use is a daily
activity.
The fact that a state's police power is used more regularly than the
federal government's war power may support the view that its use
should be subjected to closer judicial scrutiny. The argument would
be that because a state's use of the police power is an everyday occur-
rence, it is more susceptible to improper use and more likely to result
in the erosion of individual rights. This argument is similar to Justice
Jackson's concern with "the tendency of a principle to expand itself to
the limit of its logic.' 142 Any act carried out under the guise of the
police power that goes beyond what is allowed under normal condi-
tions would present the opportunity for an unscrupulous leader to take
advantage and claim a power supported by a judicial confirmation of
its legitimacy. 43 The risk is greater in the police power context than
in the war power context because the actor would receive judicial
approval for an exercise of a power that is used with more regularity
than the war power.
However, in the context of an emergency power, the power is
constrained by definition, regardless of whether it is the federal
government's war power or the state's police power. 44 The issue is
far removed from a state's everyday use of the police power because
the emergency measures are by definition temporary.145 By its very
186, 192 n.5 (1968) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1877)); see also The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (The police power of a state "is, and must be from its
very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of
social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property.").
1
42 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1949)).
143See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 138, at 219 ("[T]he laws made to deal with the
emergency may become embedded in the normal legal system, essentially enacting permanent
changes in that system under color of the emergency. Liberties won slowly over long periods of
time may be subject to rapid erosion in emergencies and these new restrictions, if they are
embedded in law, may not be rapidly restored if they are restored at all.").
1
44 Similarly, the furthest extent of the federal government's war power was considered, by
at least one Justice, to be at issue in Hirabayashi. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J.,
concurring) ("In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.").
145 See, e.g., Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416 (the statute was due to expire when the emergency
ceased); Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (the curfew was adjusted as the recovery pro-
gressed); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (D.V.I. 1989). I acknowledge that this
topic touches closely on the much-debated issue of whether the laws are or should be somehow
suspended or altered to respond to an emergency. But, to be sure, the issue is not a new form of
power or law, but rather, the furthest permissible extent of the existing power brought about by
the most extreme circumstances to justify its use. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 48; Dyzen-
haus, supra note 139; Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 138; Gross, supra note 16; Kim Lane
Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004).
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nature, an emergency is constrained by time and circumstances, and
likewise "the duration of the remedy is limited.., by the duration of
the disease.' 46 The purpose of the emergency measure is to return the
state of things to normalcy, and the aim is that the "temporary nature
of emergency legislation will prevent it from corrupting the normal
legal system."'' 47 Thus, regardless of the claimed power-war or
police-the ultimate issue is the duration of the surrounding
circumstances that justify the action. In such a situation, the everyday
exercise of the governmental power is a non-issue because it is the
rarity of the occasion that creates and defines the scope of the
emergency measure.
Under the Process-Reasonableness test, the reasonableness
analysis constrains the possible extension of an emergency power to
regular non-emergency government action. For example, if a state
legislature enacted a statute that gave the governor the authority to
order the forced evacuation of any city at any time, and the governor
acted on that authorization on a normal Tuesday afternoon, the
evacuation would almost certainly be challenged as an
unconstitutional infringement of numerous individual rights. If the
governor argued that he or she was acting with the express
authorization of the legislature, and was therefore well within the
state's emergency powers when acting on that authorization, the
governor would prevail on the Process Prong of the test. The
governor, however, would almost certainly fail the Reasonableness
Prong without a recognized emergency to back up the action.
One of the two questions that the courts consider under the Rea-
sonableness Prong is whether an emergency actually exists. In all of
the cases discussed above, the challengers never seriously contested
the existence of the emergency because the government's action was
in response to unquestionable circumstances of war, economic de-
pression, or natural disaster. 48 The lack of a challenge to the exis-
tence of an emergency implicitly supports the reasonableness of the
government's use of its emergency power. In the absence of an emer-
gency, or if the existence of an emergency is arguable, the strength of
the government's position is drastically weakened. Further, the gov-
ernment is more likely to encounter persuasive arguments that its
action was pretextual if it was not supported by the existence of an
actual emergency. Simply put, it is unreasonable to claim an emer-
gency power when there is no emergency.
'46 Kahan, supra note 8, at 1293.
'
47 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 138, at 219 (describing the "negative belief' of the
legislative emergency power model).
]aSee supra note 25.
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At this point in my argument it is sufficient to say that the power at
issue should not and, moreover, cannot be the reasoning behind an
elevated standard of judicial review for state government emergency
actions following natural disasters. That is to say, if the Court applies
the Process-Reasonableness test to review the federal government's
use of its war power, then it cannot justify a more probing inquiry
into a state government's use of its police power solely based on the
nature of the two powers. Each power is inherently vague in order to
ensure that the government has discretion to deal with emergencies.
Also, each power is constrained by the time and circumstances defin-
ing its use. Thus, the distinction between the federal government's
war power and the state government's police power cannot be relied
on to support an argument for a higher standard of scrutiny for the
latter.
B. The Representative Capacities of Congress and State Legislatures
One objection to the courts applying the same standard to chal-
lenges of both federal and state emergency powers could be based on
the inherent differences between the representative capacities of Con-
gress and state legislatures. Congress, as a legislative body, represents
the collective will of the people of the United States. State legisla-
tures, by contrast, only represent the collective will of the people of
their state. The argument against the use of the same standard for both
federal and state emergency powers based on this simple distinction is
as follows: the Process-Reasonableness test allows for the legislative
body to consent to a trade-off of constitutional liberty for the return of
social order, because emergency powers are drastic actions implicat-
ing federal constitutional rights, Congress is better suited than state
legislatures to determine when constitutional rights may be traded-off.
A point of clarification is necessary prior to discussing this distinc-
tion. Emergency powers do not implicate a "waiver" of constitutional
rights. The limitations on individual rights are not newly created by
an emergency, and are not temporarily waived by an emergency. This
was the position of Chief Justice Chase in Milligan,149 as well as the
Court in Blaisdell when it observed that:
[G]rants of power to the federal government and... limita-
tions of the power of the States were determined in the light
of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency . . ..
While emergency does not create power, emergency may fur-
nish the occasion for the exercise of power.. . "emergency
149 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring).
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may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already
enjoyed."'' 50
"Police power is inherent in the sovereignty of every state and is
reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment."' 15' David G.
Tucker and Alfred 0. Bragg, 1I argue that "[t]he police power is a
source of power available to local governments under which, in an
emergency situation, they may take extraordinary action to protect the
public." 152 An inherent characteristic of the police power is that its
use implicates a restriction on individual rights. 153 State legislatures
make the determinations as to acceptable trade-offs of liberty with
every invocation of their police power. 54 The courts have long
accepted that the states possess the power to determine whether a
trade-off in individual rights to protect the public good is necessary.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that state and local governments
are just as ably suited, if not more so, than Congress to determine
whether a trade-off in liberty for the public good is acceptable. Thus,
a court cannot justify a more probing inquiry into the state
government's use of its police power based on the representative
capacity of the legislative body consenting to the trade-off in liberty.
C. Emergency Rationale
There are two primary rationales that justify a government's re-
sponse to an emergency: relief and prevention. 55 Relief focuses on
caring for the victims and restoring order.156 Prevention addresses the
cause of the emergency and preventing a repeat occurrence.
157
The response to each form of emergency-natural disaster, eco-
nomic crisis, and war-implicates each rationale. In the natural disas-
ter context, relief is the primary focus. 58 Assisting those that have
been harmed is at the forefront of the governmental response; pre-
venting future devastation is a secondary concern in the natural disas-
ter context. Conversely, in times of war prevention is the primary
focus. The government's primary concern is to identify the attacker;
'-Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425-26 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)).
"I Tucker & Bragg, supra note 8, at 840 (citing Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919)).
152 Tucker & Bragg, supra note 8, at 850.
153 See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 611 & nn.16-22 (2005).
154Id.
155 Ackerman, supra note 48, at 1057.
156 Id. (explaining when the relief rationale is appropriate).
57Id. at 1058.
158id. at 1057 ("The relief rationale conceives of the emergency in a technocratic
spirit .... The model here is provided by the countless statutes dealing with 'states of emer-
gency' generated by natural disasters.").
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addressing the harm that has already been done, although an issue of
great national interest and social concern, is secondary.
Using the events of Hurricane Katrina as an example, the political
finger pointing following the hurricane was based on the govern-
ment's delay in providing relief. 59 The people of New Orleans were
dubbed "refugees," seeking shelter and food, and the response effort
was directed, although in this instance inefficiently, at easing their
plight. In the future, government officials will turn their attention to
how the flooding could have been prevented and what steps need to
be taken to prevent a reoccurrence of the massive destruction caused
by the broken levees.' 6°
In contrast, and using the events of 9/11 as an example, in times of
war, governmental response centers on identifying the cause and pre-
venting future attack. The nation was certainly concerned with the
plight of the families of those who died in the 9/11 attacks. However,
the government's response was almost immediately directed at identi-
fying Osama Bin Ladin and his al-Qaeda network as the cause, and
subsequently declaring a "war on terror" to prevent future attacks.
Thus, although relief was a concern following the 9/11 attacks, the
government immediately focused on identifying a "them," and the
prevention rationale.
The prevention rationale is problematic because during wartime,
"emergency powers are often perceived as directed against a clear
enemy of 'others.' 161 In the context of an emergency instigated by
war, there exists a conception of "them" as the wrongdoers and "us"
as the innocent victims. 162 It is within this "us" versus "them" context
that "[w]e allow for more repressive emergency measures" because
"we believe that we are able to peek beyond the veil and ascertain that
such powers will not be turned against US.",
16 3
The perception of a "them," however, is lacking in the natural dis-
aster context because the "attacker," i.e., nature, cannot be targeted in
any meaningful way. The concern that a state government will use the
159 See Bumiller, supra note 8; Dao, Treaster & Barringer, supra note 4; Purdum, supra
note 8; Saulny, supra note 9.160 See Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 2. Preventing and mitigating the effects of a natu-
ral disaster is one of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) most significant
roles. See Tucker & Bragg, supra note 8, at 838.
161 Gross, supra note 16, at 1082.
162 See id. at 1084 ("Stereotyping often is employed with respect both to insiders and out-
siders, emphasizing good, noble, and worthy attributes of the former, and negative traits of the
latter.").
163Id. at 1083 (using increased approval of racial profiling to identify potential terrorists
following 9/11 as an example). But see Kahan, supra note 8, at 1297 (arguing that "because an
economic crisis does not arise against a nameable enemy, there is little ideology to restrain the
hand of the government from unconstitutional crisis action") (footnote omitted).
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emergency situation to pray on the fears of the public and take "more
repressive emergency measures" than are absolutely necessary is di-
minished because there is not a "them" to target.
A comparison of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the fed-
eral government's actions during World War II and following Sep-
tember 11 aptly demonstrates the danger created by the identification
of a "them" that is not present in the context of a natural disaster.
Mayor Nagin's orders were inclusive of the entire city and all persons
that remained within it.164 His orders were directed at restoring order
and providing relief to the people that were trapped in the chaos re-
sulting from the devastation. His orders could not target a "them" to
prevent future devastation because nature cannot be prevented from
reoccurring. This was never more evident than when Hurricane Rita
struck the city just a little less than month after Hurricane Katrina. 165
In contrast, following 9/11 the federal government has used racial
and ethnic profiling, specifically of Arab-looking men at airports, as a
method of preventing future attacks. 166 The American public accepts
racial profiling because most Americans "[are] not the intended tar-
gets and their rights [are] unlikely to be infringed."'167 Thus, the pre-
vention of another attack is viewed as a justifiable trade-off for the
infringement of the rights of "them." Similarly, the orders at issue in
the Japanese internment cases were explicitly directed at people of
Japanese ancestry because Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and there was
fear of future sabotage and espionage.
Natural disasters are no more Japanese than they are Anglo-Saxon.
Following a natural disaster, the government's focus is on relief and a
natural disaster is not readily susceptible to the same oppressive
abuses attributable to war. Therefore, state government emergency
power following natural disasters should not be held to a higher stan-
dard than federal government emergency power during war.
This is not to say that the aftermath of a natural disaster is free
from the possibility of political corruption, because "whether emer-
gency measures triggered by natural disasters may be abused by un-
scrupulous leaders" remains open to debate. 68 The complaint filed by
164But see Complaint 1 33, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Nagin, Civ. No. 05-04234 (E.D.
La. Sept. 22, 2005) (alleging that "wealthy persons" were omitted from Mayor Nagin's firearm
order).
165 Hurricane Rita came ashore on September 23, 2005. See Simon Romero & Jere Long-
man, Storm Lashes Coast; Levees Breached in New Orleans: Path Veers East Threatening Oil
Plants, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 24,2005, at Al.
166 Gross, supra note 16, at 1083.
167 Id.
168 Jon Elster, Comments on the Paper by Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L.
240, 241 (2004).
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the NRA and Buell 0. Teel, for example, alleges that Mayor Nagin's
orders were applied based on socioeconomic status. 169 Further, many
are concerned that the rebuilding effort in New Orleans will exclude
lower income residents.
Political corruption is a justifiable argument against a lenient
standard of review of state emergency actions after a natural disaster.
And, inasmuch as the Process-Reasonableness test accounts for
political corruption by inquiring into whether the actions were
pretextually motivated, an even more lenient standard is not justified.
An argument could be made that because state actions following a
natural disaster are less likely to be used for politically corrupt
purposes, they should be satisfied by a less probing inquiry or require
a higher standard of proof than pretextual motive. One example of a
higher standard of proof would be for the courts to review a state
government's action for malice toward a particular group of people.
Although similar to reviewing for pretextual motive, proving that a
state government actually intended a harmful effect on the subject
classification would be more difficult than showing that the action
was aimed at a particular group without regard for intent to harm.
The question, however, is why would a higher standard be neces-
sary for state government actions? As the decisions in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu more than aptly demonstrate, when reviewing for
pretext, the Court's analysis is nothing if not lenient No emergency
action has ever been held unconstitutional because it was pretextual.
An even more lenient standard of review may be too enticing to the
leader that shuns the admonition that absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely. Equally, an even more lenient standard may not account for the
continued existence of "unscrupulous leaders." Thus, although con-
cern for state governments overreaching under the prevention ration-
ale following natural disasters is diminished, it is not apparent why
state action should receive a lower standard of review than federal
action. Understandably, this discussion could be used to argue for
stricter judicial scrutiny of federal emergency actions, but that is not
the focus of this Note.
In sum, social support builds in favor of governmental action
during wartime due to the perception of an enemy, which in turn
provides a greater opportunity for abuse of the emergency power.
Following a natural disaster, however, there is a decreased fear of
abuse of the emergency power by the local government because there
is no identifiable enemy. Thus, the judicial review of a local
169 Complaint 1 31-34, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Nagin, Civ. No. 05-04234 (E.D. La.
Sept. 22, 2005).
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government's emergency measures should, at a maximum, be the
same as that applied to the federal government's use of its war power.
There is, however, no justifiable reason to impose a higher standard
of proof or more lenient judicial review of state action than the
already lenient Process-Reasonableness test.
D. Conclusion
Although the distinctions discussed above may weigh in favor of
either a more lenient standard of review or a higher standard of proof,
none of the distinctions give a justifiable reason why a state govern-
ment should receive more favorable treatment following a natural
disaster. The courts' Process-Reasonableness test is built on the prem-
ise that the politically accountable branches should remain in control
of the policy decisions as long as they have reasonable motives. Be-
cause the courts avoid making policy judgments concerning emer-
gency measures, the burden on the political branches to support their
actions is near the ground, and it is not apparent what benefit would
accrue to the state governments from an even more lenient standard.
At best, the distinctions discussed above lead to the conclusion that a
state government is less likely to abuse its emergency power than the
federal government, but that conclusion does not mean a state gov-
ernment will never abuse its power. A more lenient standard would
do nothing other than open the door for abuse, and since no benefit
accrues to the state government, that door should remain closed (or at
least as closed as it currently is).
II. MAYOR NAGIN'S ORDERS: AN OPINION
This Note was instigated by the questionable constitutionality of
Mayor Nagin's orders following Hurricane Katrina. The intent has
never been to assert that a particular method of review is the best
method to reach a determination of that issue. Rather, this Note
sought to determine what method is used in current practice. To that
end, this Note has argued that the Process-Reasonableness test is the
method that present-day courts apply to challenges of state or local
officials' use of emergency powers following natural disasters. This
Note now considers how the Process-Reasonableness test may resolve
challenges to Mayor Nagin's evacuation and firearms orders. Ulti-
mately, Mayor Nagin's evacuation order was likely constitutional,
while his firearms order was likely unconstitutional under certain
circumstances.
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A. Mayor Nagin's Evacuation Order
A claimant challenging Mayor Nagin's evacuation order would
quickly lose the process analysis. The Louisiana Legislature conferred
to the chief executive officer of a municipality the power to "[d]irect[]
and compel[] the evacuation of all or part of the population from any
stricken or threatened area within the municipality if he deems this
action necessary."' 170 Plainly, the legislature explicitly gave Mayor
Nagin the discretion to compel an evacuation. Thus, the politically
accountable branches-the legislature and Mayor Nagin-authorized
the evacuation and the Process Prong is satisfied.
The reviewing court must then address the Reasonableness Prong.
Mayor Nagin's judgment that the use of the police power was neces-
sary was justified by the circumstances the city faced. Parties chal-
lenging Mayor Nagin' s evacuation order would not be credible if they
contend that an emergency did not in fact exist within the City of
New Orleans. A court hearing such a claim is likely to take judicial
notice of the emergency. 1'
The uncontestable existence of an emergency created by Hurricane
Katrina greatly shifts the argument in favor of the government. Mayor
Nagin would most likely argue that due to the scarcity of available
food and drinking water, as well as fear of gas leaks, fires, toxic
water, and diseases spread by mosquitoes, his mandatory evacuation
order was necessary to restore order.172 The claimants may respond
with plausible arguments that they were well situated with enough
food and drinking water, medically trained and capable of
understanding the health risks involved, and acted to the benefit of the
recovery by preventing looting and beginning the clean-up of
neighborhoods.1 73 The claimants' arguments, however, would not
negate the existence of the emergency created by the disorder and
chaos within the city.
The court must still review for pretextual motive. The court
reviewing a challenge to Mayor Nagin's evacuation order may rely on
170 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:727(F)(5) (2006). The term "Parish President" includes the
Mayor of New Orleans as defined by statute. Id. § 29:723(5).
171 See Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (D.V.. 1989) (taking judicial notice
of the continued devastation on the island of St. Croix); supra notes 120-21 and accompanying
text.
72Jere Longman & Sewell Chan, Flooding Recedes in New Orleans; U.S Inquiry Is Set,
N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 7, 2005, at Al.
173 See Berenson, supra note 11 (reporting that holdouts on dry ground expressed their de-
sire to stay because they were taking proper health precautions and "hoped to find a job as the
city's cleanup progressed"); Alex Berenson, Holdouts on Dry Ground Say, "Why Leave Now?",
N.Y. TIES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al (reporting that holdouts described their efforts to aid in the
recovery by helping to rescue people and deter further looting in their neighborhoods).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Korematsu as authority for upholding the wholesale evacuation of all
persons whether or not they were determined to be looters. The Avino
Court, as noted above, relied on Korematsu as authority for the
imposition of the curfew following Hurricane Andrew. 174 The
Korematsu Court upheld the reasonableness of the evacuation and
internment of people of Japanese ancestry because of the difficulty in
discerning whether each individual person was loyal to the United
States.171 Similarly, Mayor Nagin's order could be upheld based on
the difficulty in discerning whether each individual intended to aid in
the recovery or hinder the recovery by looting. The distinction
between Korematsu's conclusion and Mayor Nagin's evacuation
order, however, would be in the reasonableness analysis. The
Korematsu Court failed to recognize the pretexual motive behind the
curfew and relocation orders. Mayor Nagin's order is unlikely to
present a similar concern because it was not aimed at a specific area
or group of individuals; rather it was inclusive of the entire city
distinctly without concern for specific areas or groups of individuals.
B. Mayor Nagin's Firearm Order
176
Mayor Nagin's order for police to take possession of any firearm,
lawfully possessed or not, was likely beyond his authority, in at least
some instances. In the same statute authorizing Mayor Nagin's
evacuation order, the legislature authorized him to "suspend or limit
the sale, dispensing, or transportation of. . . firearms."' 17 7 A court re-
viewing a challenge may look at the intent of the legislature to deter-
mine whether it intended for the statute to authorize police to take
lawfully possessed firearms from individuals.178
174 Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
175 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944). See also Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (holding the continued detention of Japanese that the government
conceded to be loyal to the United States as outside the intended purpose of the evacuation and
detention ratified by Congress).
176 The NRA reached a settlement with New Orleans and arranged for the return of fire-
arms seized following Hurricane Katrina. See National Rifle Association of America, Institute
for Legislative Action, NRA and New Orleans Reach Agreement on Return of Firearms Confis-
cated During Katrina, Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.nraila.org/CurrentLegislation/Read.aspx?ID=
2057.
17n LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29:727(F)(8) (2006).
178 The Hirabayashi Court conducted a similar inquiry to determine whether Congress's
ratification included consideration of a curfew order. Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
89-91 (1943). The Court concluded that the curfew order, although not explicitly listed in either
Executive Order 9066 or Congress's ratification, was within the scope of the authorization
because "the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was advised that curfew orders were
among those intended." l at 91 (construing Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942)).
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Mayor Nagin may argue that his firearm order was consistent with
the provision of the statute permitting him to suspend the transporta-
tion of firearms. In that regard, claimants may be divided into two
classifications: 1) claimants, like Buell 0. Teel, who had firearms
taken from them as they traveled throughout the city; 179 and 2) claim-
ants who had their firearms taken from them inside a residence.,
80
Claimants who were within a residence have a much stronger ar-
gument that they were not transporting their firearms, and therefore
the statute does not authorize the confiscation of their lawfully pos-
sessed firearms. Mayor Nagin may respond by arguing that an explicit
authorization of his firearm order is not required. He may rely on the
Hirabayashi Court's conclusion that Executive Order 9066 and Con-
gress's ratification authorized the curfew order despite the lack of
reference to curfew restrictions within their text.'8 ' He would argue
that the legislature's intent was to allow the restoration of order by
taking firearms, and the statute should not be so narrowly interpreted
as to defeat that purpose.
General principles of statutory construction, however, conflict with
this argument. The statute enumerates specific situations when law-
fully possessed firearms may be confiscated during an emergency. By
negative implication, the enumerated list indicates that the legislature
considered several situations when citizens may possess firearms dur-
ing an emergency. The legislature chose to create a limited list instead
of an expansive general provision providing for the confiscation of
lawfully possessed firearms. Congress' ratification in the Japanese
internment cases, by contrast, included the expansive "any act" lan-
guage that allowed the Court to find an implicit authorization of the
curfew order.182 Without an expansive provision, the court cannot find
implicit authorization beyond the specifically delegated situations,
and Mayor Nagin's firearms order, as applied to claimants who were
within a residence, is beyond the legislature's authorization.
Mayor Nagin could argue that the legislature's underlying motiva-
tion when creating the statute was to allow for the restoration of or-
der, and his order was necessary to achieve that end. This argument,
however, would fall on deaf ears. The courts do not concern them-
179Complaint 19, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Nagin, Civ. No. 05-04234 (E.D. La. Sept.
22, 2005), available at http://www.saf.org/new.orleans.lawsuit/complaint.declaratory.injunctive.
relief.pdf.
M'L 1d 116.
181 Executive Order 9066 authorized the restriction of "the right of any person to enter, re-
main in, or leave" and Congress's ratification provided for punishment of anyone who "shall
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act." Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942), quoted
in Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 86-87.182 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 87.
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selves with policy or means-ends analysis when determining whether
the Process Prong has been satisfied. Thus, regardless of whether
Mayor Nagin's firearm order was necessary, his order still lacks legis-
lative authorization. Assuming there are no other facts that may place
the resident-claimants within the framework of the statute, the firearm
order fails the Process Prong as applied to claimants who were within
a residence, and the court must declare it unconstitutional.
Claimants, such as Buell 0. Teel, who had firearms taken from
them while traveling throughout the city, may have to argue against
the reasonableness of the order because a court could determine that
they were transporting firearms within the meaning of the statute.
Again, the claimants would have to concede to the existence of an
emergency created by Hurricane Katrina. The claimants' best argu-
ment may rest on the fact that, in taking their firearms, the govern-
ment was leaving them at a greater risk to be victimized by looters.
They may argue, as Buell 0. Teel asserts in his complaint, that they
had their firearms for protection from looters and were, therefore, put
at an unreasonable risk by Mayor Nagin's firearm order.' 83 However,
Mayor Nagin would argue that the police were instructed to err on the
side of caution and take firearms from everyone that remained within
the city in order to protect the police officers and recovery workers
alike. Thus, there was no pretext and the order was simply an efficient
method of protecting officers and recovery workers.
In its complaint, the NRA asserts an equal protection claim that
may provide the basis for a pretexual motive argument.184 The
complaint states that the firearm order was not applied to "wealthy
persons" that were able to "keep... and/or to retain armed private
security personnel to protect their more expensive homes and
properties. 185 If the NRA is able to link Mayor Nagin to a pretextual
motive to allow "wealthy persons" to retain their guns, e.g., forcing
lower-class persons out of the city so that only higher-class persons
will remain when the city is rebuilt, then the court must find that the
order was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
This Note's aim was twofold: (1) to set out the standard of review
that the courts apply to challenges of state emergency power follow-
ing natural disasters; and (2) to determine how that standard would
183 Complaint 13, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Nagin, Civ. No. 05-04234 (E.D. La.
Sept. 22, 2005).
Id H 31-34.
IId 133.
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resolve challenges to Mayor Nagin's orders following Hurricane
Katrina. The Process-Reasonableness test is a deferential test that
allows the politically accountable branches wide latitude to address
the unpredictable situations created by emergencies. A court's first
step is the Process Prong, where it analyzes whether the politically
accountable branches authorized the challenged action. Next, a court
must resolve the Reasonableness Prong by asking whether an emer-
gency actually existed and whether the government's action had a
prextual motive. If the politically accountable branches authorized the
action, an emergency existed, and their action was not pretextual, then
the government's action was constitutional.
Mayor Nagin's evacuation order passes the Process-
Reasonableness test. Louisiana law explicitly authorizes Mayor Nagin
to compel evacuation, Hurricane Katrina created an unquestionable
emergency, and there is no evidence of a pretextual motive. Accord-
ingly, a court hearing a challenge to the evacuation order must find
that the order is constitutional. Mayor Nagin's firearm order, how-
ever, is not as successful. Whether Mayor Nagin's firearm order fails
the Process Prong of the test depends on whether a claimant's firearm
was taken from him or her within a residence. 186 If the Process Prong
is satisfied, the Reasonableness Prong is satisfied because Hurricane
Katrina created an emergency, and there is no evidence of pretext.
Once again, the argument here is not that the Process-
Reasonableness test is the standard that courts should apply. Rather,
this Note argues that the Process-Reasonableness test is the standard
that the courts do apply to federal government emergency actions and
courts should apply the same standard to state government actions
following a natural disaster. Applying the Process-Reasonableness
186 The NRA has taken great strides to prevent an order similar to Mayor Nagin's firearm
order from passing the Process Prong. The NRA has backed legislation in Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia to explicitly prohibit state executives from confiscating
firearms from citizens in times of emergency. See S.B. 1401, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2006); S.B. 93, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006); H.B. 36, 2006 Leg., Reg. Session (La. 2006);
H.B. 136, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006); H.B. 172, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006); H.B.
760, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006); H.B. 1141, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2006); S.B.
2928, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006); H.B. 1265, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006).
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test, Mayor Nagin's orders were constitutionally permissible, with the
exception of taking firearms from people within their residences.
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